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Abstract
We propose various zero knowledge protocols based on the algorithmic problem of find-
ing isomorphisms between central simple algebras over number fields given by structure
constants. We also design a protocol which is based on the hardness of finding an element
with a prescribed minimal polynomial in a central simple algebra given by structure con-
stants. This protocol allows arbitrarily long challenges and thus can be turned into a digital
signature scheme.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose an authentication system based on the following algorithmic problem
(and its variants). LetA be a finite-dimensional associative algebra over a field K. Let b1, . . . , bm
be a basis of A. Then the products bibj can be expressed as linear combinations of the basis
elements: bibj = ∑
m
k=1 γijkbk. The γijk are called structure constants and we consider A to be
given by a collection of structure constants. Assume thatA is isomorphic to Mn(K), the algebra
of n times n matrices over K. The algorithmic task is to compute an isomorphism between A
and Mn(K). We will refer to this problem as the explicit isomorphism problem.
This is a well studied problem in computational algebra [14], [13], [18], [16], [5]. It has
connections to arithmetic geometry [3], [4], [5], norm equations [14], parametrization of alge-
braic varieties [11] and error-correcting codes [10]. It is also known that when K = Q and
A ∼= M2(Q), then the problem of finding an isomorphism is at least as hard factoring inte-
gers [20]. Moreover, when K is a number field and n is large enough then the problem seems to
be even harder than integer factorization. To our knowledge the difficulty of this problem has
never been exploited for cryptographic purposes.
On the other hand Hartung and Schnorr [12] proposed and authentications system which
relies on the difficulty of finding an explicit equivalence of integral quadratic forms. In a sense
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our schemes can be thought of as a higher degree generalization of the protocols in [12] as the
equivalence problem of rational quadratic forms is very similar to the isomorphism problem
of quaternion algebras. Our generalization however might allow much smaller keys as the
current methods for solving the explicit isomorphism problem over number fields ( [14]) are
highly exponential in the n and in the degree of the number field (but polynomial in the size of
the structure constants).
We will describe three protocols. They are all based on certain isomorphism problems. The
first one is based on the explicit isomorphism problem. The second one relies on the difficulty of
computing isomorphism between division algebras over number fields (this can be reduced to
an instance of the explicit isomorphism problem but with a quadratic increase in the dimension
of the algebra over K). The third one is based on the isomorphism problem of orders in central
simple algebras. All these protocols are based on one-bit challenges. We also describe a protocol
based on the problem of finding elements with prescribedminimal polynomials in a full matrix
algebra given by structure constants. The advantage of this protocol is that it can give arbitrarily
long challenges and thus can be turned into a digital signature scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we summarize all known results
which we will use later on. In the third section we give the detailed description of the protocols
and prove their validity.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Theoretical background
In this subsection we give a brief overview of the theoretical results needed for the descriptions
of our protocols.
Definition 1. An associative algebra A over a field K is simple if it has no nontrivial two-sided ideals.
It is a well-know theorem of Artin that every finite dimensional algebra over a field K is
isomorphic to a full matrix algebra over some division algebra whose center is an extension of
K.
Definition 2. A simple algebra A is called central simple over K if its center is exactly K.
The tensor product of two finite-dimensional central simple K-algebras is again a central
simple K-algebra. Two central simple algebras over K are Brauer equivalent if their underlying
division algebras are isomorphic (note that by Artin’s theorem a central simple algebra is a full
matrix algebra over a division algebra). Equivalence classes of central simple algebras form
a group under the tensor product, called the Brauer group of the field K. This implies that in
order to understand central simple algebras over a fixed field one has to understand the division
algebras over that field.
Definition 3. Let K be a field and let L be a cyclic extension of K (i.e., a Galois extension whose Galois
group is cyclic) of degree n . Let σ be a generator of the Galois group. Let a ∈ K. Then the following
algebra A is called a cyclic algebra:
1. un = a · 1
2. A = ⊕n−1i=0 Lu
i
3. u−1lu = σ(l) for every l ∈ L
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This algebra is denoted by (L|K, σ, a).
It is well known (see [17, Chapter 15]) that a cyclic algebra is a central simple algebra over K
of dimension n2. Moreover, the cyclic algebra (L|K, σ, a) is isomorphic to Mn(K) if and only if
a is a norm in the extension L|K. We conclude by the definition of an order in a central simple
algebra:
Definition 4. Let R be an integral domain with quotient field K. LetA be a central simple K-algebra. A
subring O of A is an order if it contains 1 and is a finitely generated R-module which contains a K-basis
of A (i.e., O⊗R K = A).
An order is called maximal, if it is maximal with respect to inclusion. Maximal orders are
non-commutative analogues of the ring of integers in algebraic number fields. For further de-
tails on maximal orders the reader is referred to Reiner’s monograph [19].
2.2 Algorithmic background
In this subsection we give a brief overview of the algorithmic history of the explicit isomor-
phism problem.
Let A be an associative algebra given by a collection of structure constants. It is a natural
algorithmic problem to compute the structure of A, i.e., compute its Jacobson radical rad A,
compute the Wedderburn decompisition of A/rad A and finally compute an explicit isomor-
phism between the simple components of A/rad A and Mn(Di) where the Di are division
algebras over K and Mn(Di) denotes the algebra of n× n matrices over Di. The problem has
been studied for various fields K, including finite fields, the field of complex and real numbers,
global function fields and algebraic number fields. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for
computing the radical ofA over any field [2]. There also exist efficient algorithms for every task
over finite fields [7], [21] and the field of real and complex numbers [6]. Finally, when K = Fq(t),
the field of rational functions over a finite field Fq, then there exist efficient algorithms for com-
putingWedderburn decompositions [15] and for computing explicit isomorphisms between full
matrix algebras over Fq(t) [13].
As it turns out, the most difficult case is when K is an algebraic number field. Wedderburn
decomposition can again be achieved in polynomial time [7], but computing isomorphisms
between central simple K-algebras is much harder. Ro´nyai [20] showed that computing an ex-
plicit isomorphism between A (given by structure constants) and M2(Q) is at least as hard as
factoring integers. On the other hand, Ivanyos, Ro´nyai and Schicho proposed an algorithm to
compute an isomorphism betweenA and Mn(Q)which is allowed to call an oracle for factoring
integers. Their algorithms is polynomial in the size of the structure constants but is exponential
in n. The bound they provide on the number of steps is infeasible even for n = 10. The key diffi-
culty of this problem lies in the fact that one has to compute a primitive idempotent inA which
is hard as even computing a zero divisor is equivalent to finding a point on a Zariski closed
set. If A is given by a cyclic algebra presentation, then finding an isomorphism between A and
Mn(Q) is equivalent to solving a norm equation over a cyclic extension which is a classical hard
problem in computational number theory. Furthermore there is no known polynomial-time al-
gorithm for computing a cyclic algebra presentation from a structure constant representation
when n is at least 10 (there is a procedure for n = 2, 3 and for small n such a presentation can be
computed from an explicit isomorphism). So in some sense this problem is harder than solving
norm equations in cyclic extensions.
On the other hand, many computations with the structure constant representation can be
carried out in polynomial time.
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Proposition 5. Let A be a central simple algebra over Q of dimension n2 and let a ∈ A. Then there
exists a polynomial-time algorithm which computes the minimal polynomial of a over Q.
Proof. The the degree of the minimal polynomial of a is at most n. Then one checks if 1, a, . . . , ai
are linearly independent starting with i = 0. If they are, then we increase i by 1 and check
again. Checking linear independence boils down to solving a system of linear equations and
the number of steps is at most n so the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
However, given a polynomial f ∈ Q[x] it is hard to find an element a ∈ A with minimal
polynomial f (when n is large enough). Note that if the constant term of f is zero, then the
suitable element should be a zero divisor. We will exploit this fact later in our digital signature
protocol.
2.3 Zero knowledge protocols
In this section we give a short survey about the interactive proof system and zero knowledge
protocols. Informally, the Zero knowledge protocol is an interactive proof system (P,V) if for
any verifier V there exists an efficient simulator S that can repeat the communication between
P and V. For the sake of completeness we give the formal definition of the zero-knowledge
protocol due to Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [9]. The reader can find the details in [8]. We
also follow [8] giving the definitions. First we give the definition of an interactive machine.
Definition 6. [8, Definition 4.2.1] (An Interactive Machine): An interactive Turing machine (ITM) is
a (deterministic) multi-tape Turing machine. The tapes are a read-only input tape, a read-only random
tape, a read-and -write work tape, a write-only output tape, a pair of communication tapes, and a read-
and-write switch tape consisting of a single cell. One communication tape is read-only, and the other is
write-only. Each ITM is associated a single bit σ ∈ {0, 1}, called its identity. An ITM is said to be active,
in a configuration, if the content of its switch tape equals the machine’s identity. Otherwise the machine
is said to be idle. While being idle, the state of the machine, the locations of its heads on the various
tapes, and the contents of the writable tapes of the ITM are not modified. The content of the input tape is
called input, the content of the random tape is called random input, and the content of the output tape at
termination is called output.The content written on the write-only communication tape during a(time)
period in which the machine is active is called the message sent at that period. Likewise, the content read
from the read-only communication tape during an active period is called the message received (at that
period). (Without loss of generality, the machine movements on both communication tapes are in only
one direction, e.g., from left to right.)
Let A and B be a linked pair of ITMs, and suppose that all possible interactions of A and B on
each common input terminate in a finite number of steps. We denote by 〈A, B〉(x) the random
variable representing the (local) output of Bwhen interactingwith machine A on common input
x, when the random input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen. (Indeed,
this definition is asymmetric, since it considers only B’s output.)
In the next step we define the (generalized) interactive proof system.
Definition 7 ( [8], Definition 4.2.6). (Generalized Interactive Proof): Let c, s : N → R be functions
satisfying c(n) > s(n) + 1
p(n)
for some polynomial p. An interactive pair (P,V) is called a (generalized)
interactive proof system for the language L, with completeness bound c and soundness bound s, if the
following holds:
-(modified) completeness: for every x ∈ L, P(〈P,V〉(x) = 1) ≥ c(|x|),
-(modified) soundness: for every x ∈ L and every interactive machine B,
P(〈B,V〉(x) = 1) ≤ s(|x|).
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The function g defined as g(n) = c(n)− s(n) is called the acceptance gap of (P,V), and the function
e, defined as e(n) = max{1− c(n), s(n)}, is called the error probability of (P,V). In particular, s is the
soundness error of (P,V), and 1− c is its completeness error.
Let (P,V) be an interactive proof system for some language L. We say that (P,V), or actually
P, is perfect zero-knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V∗
there exists an (ordinary) probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M∗ such that for every x ∈ L
the following two random variables are identically distributed: 〈P,V∗〉(x) (i.e., the output of
the interactive machine V∗ after interacting with the interactive machine P on common input
x) and M∗(x) (i.e., the output of machine M∗ on input x). Machine M∗ is called a simulator for
the interaction of V∗ with P.
Now we give the formal definition of Perfect Zero- Konwledge.
Definition 8 ( [8], Definition 4.3.1). (Perfect Zero-Knowledge): Let (P,V) be an interactive proof
system for some language L. We say that (P,V) is perfect zero-knowledge if for every probabilistic
polynomial-time interactive machine V∗ there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M∗ such
that for every x ∈ L the following two conditions hold:
1. With probability at most 12 , on input x, machine M
∗ outputs a special symbol denoted ⊥ (i.e.,
P[M∗(x) =⊥] ≤ 12 ).
2. Let m∗(x) be a random variable describing the distribution of M∗(x) conditioned on M∗(x) 6=⊥
(i.e., P[m∗(x) = α] = P[M∗(x) = α|M∗(x) 6=⊥] for every α ∈ {0, 1}∗). Then the following random
variables are identically distributed:
-〈P,V〉(x) (i.e.,the output of the interactive machine V∗ after interacting with the interactive ma-
chine P on common input x)
-m∗(x) (i.e., the output of machine M∗ on input x, conditioned on not being ⊥)
Machine M∗ is called a perfect simulator for the interaction of V∗ with P.
3 Description of the protocols
In this section we describe two types of zero knowledge protocols. The first kind are protocols
which return one bit challenges and the second kind are protocols which can return arbitrarily
long challenges. For the first type we describe three versions based on three different isomor-
phism problems: isomorphisms of full matrix algebras, isomorphisms of division algebras and
isomorphisms of orders in central simple algebras. The other protocol is based on the hardness
of finding an element with a prescribed polynomial in a central simple algebra. If the algebra
is a full matrix algebra, then this is of similar difficulty then finding an isomorphism, however,
when the algebra is a division algebra, then this problem could be more difficult.
3.1 General protocol
Let A0,A1 be algebras isomorphic to Mk(Q) given by structure constants (i.e., by a Q-basis
and a multiplication table). Here k is some security parameter which should be around 10. We
describe a zero-knowledge protocol based on the following data: the structure constants for
A0,A1 are the public keys and an isomorphism φ betweenA0 andA1 are private. The protocol
is defined by the following procedure. Let P be the prover and V be the verifier. First P chooses
an algebra B (with structure constants) and an isomorphism ψ : A0 → B. This can be done by
choosing a random element r in A0 and conjugating A0 by r (the probability that an element
is invertible is large). Then P sends B to V but not the isomorphism ψ. Then V sends back a
random bit i ∈ {0, 1}. Finally P sends back ψ ◦ φ−i. If i = 0 then this is an isomorphism between
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A0 and B, if i = 1, then this is an isomorphism betweenA1 and B. This protocol is described in
the following pictogram:
Protocol 1
P V
(ψ,B) ← A0
B
i ←$ {0, 1}
δ = ψ ◦ φ−i
δ
3.2 Division algebras
A variation of Protocol 1 could be to replace A0 and A1 by isomorphic division algebras of
dimension k2 over Q. For simplicity we assume that the security parameter k here is squarefree.
Finding an isomorphism in this setting seems to be more difficult (it can be reduced to the
matrix algebra case with security parameter k2 [14, Section 4]). However, finding a division
algebra over Q is not obvious. Here we describe a method for constructing division algebras
of degree k. Since k is squarefree, it is the product of distinct prime numbers. Let p be a prime
number which divides k. We look for a division algebra in a cyclic algebra formDp = (K|Q, σ, a)
where a ∈ Q, K is a cyclic extension of Q of degree pwhose Galois group is generated by σ. The
cyclic algebra D is a division algebra if a is not a norm in the extension K|Q . The fact that a is
a norm can be described by a degree p equation. If we choose a random a (uniformly from a
large interval), then by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma a will not be a norm with high probability.
This provides a randomized polynomial time algorithm for constructing a division algebra of
degree p. We construct the division algebras Dp for every prime divisor p of k. Then
D = ⊗pDp
is a division algebra of degree k as its order in the Brauer group equals its degree.
We have to mention that there are several other standard ways of constructing division al-
gebras over Q (for example using Hasse invariants).
3.3 Orders in central simple algebras
Another variations of Protocol 1 is the following. Now assume thatA is a central simple algebra
of dimension k2 over Q (it may be a division algebra or a full matrix algebra as well) and let
O be an order in A. Now we assume that an algebra is not only given by structure constants,
but also with a starting order. Instead of having an isomorphism between A0 and A1 we have
an isomorphism between the two algebras which is an isomorphism restricted to the orders as
well. Note that an order in A can be computed in polynomial time (by multiplying the original
basis elements by a suitable integer which makes the corresponding structure constants inte-
gral), thus finding an isomorphism between orders is more difficult than finding isomorphisms
between central simple algebras.
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We could also restrict ourselves to isomorphisms between orders which are in some sense
bounded. An isomorphism between two algebras can be represented by a k2 × k2 matrix and
we could require this matrix to have bounded integer entries.
3.4 Long challenges
This protocol differs more from the original one as the previous two. The reason is that we
need a protocol where the verifier can send back arbitrarily long challenges (not just one bit
challenges as in Protocol 1) because such a protocol can be turned into a digital signature scheme
[1], [12].
Again we start with A0 and A1 which are full matrix algebras over Q given by structure
constants. The public key consists of A0 and A1 (with their structure constant representation)
and a random element a ∈ A0. The isomorphism φ between A0 and A1 is private. Then
the first step is the same, P chooses an isomorphism ψ between A0 and B and sends B to V.
Then V chooses an isomorphism δ between B and C and sends over C and δ as well. Then P
computes A′ = δ(ψ(φ−1(a))) and sends over a′. Finally V checks whether a and a′ have the
same minimal polynomial and accepts if this is satisfied. This procedure is summarized in the
following pictogram:
Protocol 2
P V
(ψ,B) ← A0
B
(δ, C) ← B
δ, C
a′ = δ(ψ(φ−1(a)))
a′
3.5 Key generation
In this subsection we describe how one can generate keys for our protocols.
In the general protocol we have to give a structure constant representation of A0 and A1,
both of which are isomorphic to Mk(Q). This can be achieved in the following manner. Choose
a random Q-basis of Mk(Q). This can be accomplished in various ways. The best is probably to
choose k2 random matrices which will form a basis with high probability. Indeed, they are lin-
early independent if the matrix formed by them has determinant zero which is a polynomial of
degree k2 with k4 variables. It is actually also important that none of the basis elements be a zero
divisor. This again can be avoided by a suitable random choice. Given a basis b1, . . . bk2 we can
compute structure constants efficiently. Let this algebra beA0. Then choose a random invertible
element of s ∈ A0. Compute structure constants with respect to the basis s
−1b1s, . . . , s
−1bn2s.
This will be your algebra A1. This method works in the division algebra case as well. Actually,
it is even simpler as there are no zero divisors in division algebras. In the case orders are also
given, one needs some extra assumptions. First one needs to compute an order in the algebra.
If one has a basis, then one can multiply the basis elements with a suitable integer which makes
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the structure constants integral. Thus we obtain a new basis c1, . . . , ck2 such that the structure
constants corresponding to this basis are integers. The Z-module generated by c1, . . . , ck2 is then
an order in the algebra. We conjugate the algebra and the order with some random invertible
element s and we obtain a new order and a new structure constant representation. In the digital
signature scheme everything is the same. One only has to generate random elements from the
algebra.
3.6 Security of the protocols
Let L be a language and (P,V) be an interactive proof system. We denote by viewV(P(x),V(x))
the output of the interactive machine V after interacting with the interactive machine P on
common input x, (i.e., all messages sent from P to V) and all random bits used by V during the
protocol on x.
Recall that (P,V) is perfect-zero knowledge on L if for any probabilistic polynomial time
interactive machine V∗ there exists an expected probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S such
that for every x ∈ L and b ∈ {0, 1} the random variables viewV∗(P(x),V(x)) and S(x, b) are
identically distributed.
We have to show that if the algebras are isomorphic then the verifier always accepts oth-
erwise he will reject the input at least with probability 12 and that the prover is perfect zero-
knowledge.
Theorem 9. The l times iteration of Protocol 1 is a proof of knowledge with knowledge error 2−l .
Proof. Since φ is an isomorphism then we always have δ(Ai) = ψ(A0). It follows that the
protocol is complete, thus the simultaneous execution of l independent copies of the protocol is
complete as well. Consider a single iteration of the protocol. Let P∗ be a dishonest prover i.e.,
a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which makes the verifier V accept on common input
x with probability p. The prover computes B send it to the verifier and replies to challenge
i ∈ {0, 1}. If V accepts then he sends the complementary bit 1− i to P∗ while keeping the old
B. Let δi be P
∗’s reply to challenge i. If V accepts again then clearly δi(Ai) = B for i = 0, 1. It
follows that
δ−11 (δ0(A0) = δ
−1
1 (ψ(A0)) = δ
−1
1 (B) = A1.
It follows that if P∗ successful twice with the same B then one can find a solution the isomor-
phism problem (A0,A1). To complete the proof we show that if P
∗ success with probability
p > 12 finds an alternative private key in expected polynomial time. Assume that P
∗ is success-
ful with probability p > 12 in a simple iteration of the protocol. Then we can run the following
algorithm T:
• P∗ compute ψ and ψ(A0) = B.
• Send ψ to V and then send ψ ◦ φ−1 while keeping B.
• If V accepts both times compute δ−11 ◦ δ0.
• Otherwise repeat until P∗ succeeds in both challenges.
Let q denote the probability that P∗ succeeds in both challenges. An easy calculation shows
that the expected number of iterations of T is 1q . We give a lower estimation to q. Let qi denote
the probability that P∗ passes on challenges i = 0, 1. It is clear that q = q0q1 and q0 + q1 = 2p.
Then we have q = q0(2p− q0). By 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, we have 2p− 1 ≤ q0 ≤ 1. It is easy to see that the
8
function f (x) = x(2p− x) takes its minimum in the boundary points of the interval [2p− 1, 1].
The minimal value is q = 2p− 1 i.e, q ≥ 2p− 1. Thus, T needs at most
1
2p− 1
iterations in expectation polynomial time. It follows that the protocol is a proof of knowledge
with probability 12 . By [8, Proposition 4.7.5] we get that the l times iteration of the protocol is a
proof of knowledge as well.
It is clear that the protocol is a honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol. Next we prove that
the protocol is fraudulent verifier zero-knowledge too.
Theorem 10. Protocol 1 is perfect zero-knowledge.
Proof. We will prove that a simulator S exists for an arbitrary verifier V. For a given verifier V
let b be the bit chosen by V at the second step of the protocol after having obtained B. Define S
by
• Choose an isomorphism ψ and i ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
• Set ψ(Ai) = B and c = b.
• If c = i output the triple (c,ψ,B), otherwise restart with a new ψ and i.
To prove that S is a valid simulator it is enough to show that if A0 and A1 are isomorphic
then S runs in expected polynomial time and the distribution of its outputs is the same as the
distribution of ViewV .
Since A0 is isomorphic to A1 and ψ is random then b cannot depend on i. It follows that c
and i are chosen independently, thus are equal with probability 12 . Then S requires two rounds
in expectation before terminate. This implies that whether or not S terminates on a particular
choice of (c,ψ) is independent of (i,ψ) and hence B. Thus, the distribution of the output is the
same as ViewV .
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